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COMMENTARIES
HOMOSEXUALS AND THE MILITARY:
INTEGRATION OR DISCRIMINATION?
Throughout the various cultures of the world, a variety of sexual practices
exist.' However, no sexual practice receives more attention or is more con-
troversial than homosexuality.2 Historically, some societies have accepted
homosexuality while others have rejected it.3 A few cultures view homosex-
uality as a right of passage on the way to manhood.4 The Greeks and
Carthaginians encouraged homosexual behavior and considered it a military
virtue by associating homosexuality with superior intellectual, aesthetic, and
ethical qualities.5 For example, if a noble male youth in Crete did not have a
male lover it spoke ill of his character.6 In ancient Greece, homosexual
soldiers were prized as fierce fighters.7
In the United States, however, society does not accept homosexual behav-
ior.' One explanation for this may be the influence of Judeo-Christian teach-
ings.9 Christianity's intolerence of homosexuality is best summarized by the
Bible's admonition: "Thou shalt not lie.with man, as with woman, it is an
abomination."' 0 The English Parliament under Henry VIII incorporated
Judeo-Christian teachings about homosexuality into law by prohibiting ho-
mosexual conduct. These early English statutes formed the foundation of
today's American laws proscribing homosexual conduct. 1
1. Yvonne L. Tharpes, Comment, Bowers v. Hardwick and the Legitimization of




5. Mark A. Stodola, Comment, The Homosexual's Legal Dilemma, 27 ARK. L. REV.
687, 688 (1973).
6. Id.
7. ARNO KARLEN, SEXUALITY AND HOMOSEXUALITY 27 (1971). The author states
that "[t]he famous sacred band of Thebes' was a force of elite shock troops composed of pairs
of [homosexual] lovers." Because of the belief that men would fight hard in order to impress
their lovers, these troops were paired in fighting units in order to enhance fighting ability. Id.
8. Tharpes, supra note 1, at 538.
9. Id. (citing a "flagrant Judeo-Christian condemnation of all forms of homosexual ex-
pression"); see also Stodola, supra note 5, at 688-89.
10. Stodola, supra note 5, at 689 (citing Leviticus 18:22).
11. Id.; see ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 483
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Discrimination based upon sexual orientation affects almost every aspect
of a homosexual's life.' 2 Because of their sexual orientation, homosexuals
have been barred from employment in the public,' 3 private, 14 governmen-
tal, 5 and military' 6 sectors of American society. However, there is no area
where homosexuals have been more severely discriminated against than in
the United States military. '7 According to current policy, homosexuals are
banned from the United States armed forces and, if discovered, are dis-
charged through either courts-martial or administrative proceedings.' 8 The
(1953) ("There appears to be no other major culture in the world in which public opinion and
the statute law so severely penalize homosexual relationships as they do in the United States
today.").
12. Tharpes, supra note 1, at 538.
13. Most of these cases are in the field of public education. E.g., McConnell v. Anderson,
451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971) (upholding university's decision to deny an applicant a position in
a university library because of his admitted homosexuality), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972);
Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973) (allowing transfer of a teacher
found to be a homosexual to a non-teaching position), aff'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498
(4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist., 559 P.2d
1340 (Wash. 1977) (upholding discharge of teacher for being a homosexual), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 879 (1977).
14. See Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual
Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 805 (1979). For cases involving discrimi-
nation against gay persons in the private sector, see Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F.
Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ga. 1975), aff'd 395 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ga. 1975) and Voyles v. Ralph K.
Davis Medical Ctr., 403 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd mem., 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir.
1978) (both cases holding that the sex discrimination prohibition of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (Supp. 1988), does not apply to sexual
orientation).
15. See Singer v. United States Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding
that Civil Service Commission's dismissal of government employee who openly advertised his
homosexuality was proper and not arbitrary and capricious), vacated, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977);
McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding that university's refusal to
employ activist homosexual is not arbitrary and capricious), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972);
Anonymous v. Macy, 398 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding that dismissal of post office em-
ployee for alleged homosexual acts is constitutional), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1041 (1969); Dew
v. Halaby, 317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (holding that removal of an Air Force veteran for
alleged preemployment homosexual acts was not arbitrary and capricious), cert. dismissed, 399
U.S. 951 (1964).
16. For cases holding that the military's policy of discharging homosexuals is constitu-
tional, see infra note 20.
17. Rivera, supra note 14, at 837. The inscription on the tombstone of Leonard
Matlovitch, a gay Vietnam veteran, reads: "When I was in the military they gave me a medal
for killing two men and a discharge for loving one." Mary Jane Solomon, Where the Somebo-
dies Are Buried, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1991, Weekend Mag., at 8.
18. Rivera, supra note 14, at 837; see also Nick Bartolomeo, Pentagon Says There's "No
Change" in Policy on Gays in the Military, WASH. BLADE, Jan. 18, 1991, at 1, 9. Under a
"Stop Loss" policy instituted by President Bush, the military told Donna Lynn Jackson, an
admitted lesbian Army Reserve Support Specialist, that she would not be discharged and
would have to serve in Operation Desert Storm despite her revelation that she was a lesbian.
However, upon Jackson's return from Saudi Arabia, the military told her that she would prob-
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Department of Defense policy regarding homosexuals states:
Homosexuality is incompatible with military service. The presence
in the military environment of persons who engage in homosexual
conduct seriously impairs the accomplishment of the military mis-
sion. The presence of such members adversely affects the ability of
the Military Services to maintain discipline, good order, and mo-
rale; to foster mutual trust and confidence among service members,
to ensure the integrity of the system of rank and command; to fa-
cilitate assignment and worldwide deployment of service members
who frequently must live and work under close conditions afford-
ing mimimal privacy; to recruit and retain members of the military
services; to maintain the public acceptability of military services;
and to prevent breaches of security. 9
ably be discharged for being a homosexual. Gay Rep. Gerry Studds (D-Mass) stated: "It is, in
my view, the lowest form of hypocrisy for the Pentagon to maintain that gays and lesbians are
unfit for military service while it sends them off to risk their lives in the Gulf." After the plight
of Jackson became public, the Pentagon reversed its original position and said that "Jackson
did not fall under 'Stop Loss' purview and would be immediately discharged from the mili-
tary" Id. at 9. See also U.S. Military Moves to Discharge Some Gay Veterans of Gulf War,
WALL ST. J., July 30, 1991, at B6. The U.S. military initiated proceedings to discharge at least
seven Operation Desert Storm veterans. In each instance, the discharge proceedings "began
after the cessation of hostilities." Id. The Army's "Commanders Handbook" states that no
discharges for homosexuality would be authorized once a reserve unit had been put on alert
notification unless discharge was requested prior to notification. Id.
19. THEODORE R. SARBIN & KENNETH E. KAROLS, DEFENSE PERSONNEL SECURITY
RESEARCH AND EDUCATION CENTER, NONCONFORMING SEXUAL ORIENTATIONS AND MIL-
ITARY SUITABILITY A9 (Dec. 1988) (citing Dep't of Defense Directive 1332.14 (Jan. 28,
1982)) (on file with THE JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY HEALTH LAW AND POLICY).
Although they differ somewhat in wording, each branch of the military service, substantially
repeats this policy:
U.S. Army - U.S. Arrhy Regulation 635-200
U.S. Navy - SECNAVINST 1900.9C (Policy for members of naval service
involved in homosexual conduct.)
- SECNAVINST 1920.4A (Enlisted Administrative Separations)
- SECNAVINST 1920.6A (Administrative Separations of Officers)
- NAVMILPERSCOMINS 1910.1C
- MILPERSMAN 3630400 (Separation by reason of homosexuality)
U.S. Marine Corps
- Marine Corps Separation and Retirement Manual, 1900-16C,
paragraph 6207 (Officers and Enlisted)
U.S. Air Force
- Air Force Regulation 39-10 (Administrative Discharge of Airmen),
Ch. 5, § 6.
- Air Force Regulation 36-2 (Separation of Officers), Ch. 3, 4.
U.S. Coast Guard - Personnel Manual Articles:
-12-B-16 discharge for unsuitability
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With little success, homosexuals have tried a variety of methods2' to in-
validate regulations barring them from serving in the United States military.
This Comment will examine the constitutionality of military regulations
under various theories: procedural due process, substantive due process, the
First Amendment, the fundamental right strand of equal protection analysis,
and the suspect class strand of equal protection analysis. In light of prece-
dent, this Comment argues that to successfully attack these regulations,
homosexuals must persuade courts to employ the suspect class strand of
equal protection analysis. Specifically, to invalidate regulations of this na-
ture, homosexuals must demonstrate the constitutional criteria for recogni-
tion as a suspect class. If this strategy proves successful, the Supreme Court
will be compelled to apply strict scrutiny analysis to regulations that dis-
criminate against homosexuals. This Comment suggests that when the
Court applies strict scrutiny it should find these regulations unconstitutional
because they fail to further a compelling governmental interest.
I. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which applies to the federal
government, provides that "no person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."2 1 The Fourteenth Amendment,
which applies to the states, dictates: "nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."22 When a govern-
ment attempts to deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property, proce-
dural due process requires that the individual be granted an opportunity to
be heard.2 3 In the case of a discharge from the military, procedural due
process protection attaches when a person has been deprived of a property or
20. See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989) (rejecting First Amend-
ment and equal protection attacks on regulations barring homosexuals from the military), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(rejecting right to privacy attack on regulations barring homosexuals from the military), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct 1295 (1990); Rich v. Sec'y of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984)
(rejecting procedural due process attack on regulations barring homosexuals from the mili-
tary); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting right to privacy and
equal protection attack on regulations barring homosexuals from the military); Belier v. Mid-
dendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980) (rejecting substantive due process attack on regulations
barring homosexuals from the military), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
22. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
23. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-7, at 664 (2d ed.
1988); see also, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) ("Procedural due process im-
poses constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of liberty or property
interests within the meaning of the due process clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amend-
ments."); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frank-
furter J., concurring) (stating that procedural due process involves "the right to be heard
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liberty interest. Therefore, the inquiry in a procedural due process claim is
whether the government deprived the plaintiffs of a property or liberty inter-
est within the scope of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.24
In the 1980s, two cases exemplified judicial reluctance to interfere with the
discharge of homosexuals from the military on procedural due process
grounds. In Belier v. Middendorf" and Rich v. Secretary of the Army,26 the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that discharge proceedings
and the ultimate separations from the military did not deprive the plaintiffs
of either property or liberty interests; thus, the courts refused to afford pro-
cedural due process protection.
In Beller, an action was brought by Navy personnel challenging the con-
stitutionality of a Navy regulation that ordered the discharge of those who
engage in homosexual conduct.27 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first
examined whether the discharge deprived the plaintiffs of their property in-
terests in continued employment. The court held that once the plaintiffs
admitted to performing homosexual acts, the Navy's regulations requiring
the termination of homosexuals divested them of any property interest in
continued employment.2" After admitting to a basis for dismissal, the plain-
tiffs renounced any "legitimate claim of entitlement" to employment.29
Similarly, in Rich, the plaintiff, an admitted homosexual, alleged that the
government deprived him of a property interest in his position as a military
serviceman by discharging him from the Army because of his sexual orienta-
tion.3° As in Beller, the Rich court held that the "plaintiff has no property
right in continued military service."'" Once the plaintiff admitted his homo-
sexuality, Army regulations required discharge, and the plaintiff no longer
had a property interest in the continuance of his career.a2 In addition, the
court acknowledged that it is "well established that there is no right to enlist
before condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind."); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394
(1914) ("The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.").
24. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (holding that there is no Fourteenth
Amendment property interest in reemployment for nontenured professor).
25. 632 F.2d 788, 810 (9th Cir. 1980) (rejecting substantive due process attack on regula-
tions barring homosexuals from the military), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
26. 735 F.2d 1220, 1227 (10th Cir. 1984) (rejecting procedural due process attack on reg-
ulations barring homosexuals from the military).
27. 632 F.2d at 792.
28. Id. at 805.
29. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972) (holding that state university profes-
sor has a Fourteenth Amendment right to a hearing on the cause for nonrenewal of his con-
tract); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972) (holding that there is no
Fourteenth Amendment property interest in reemployment for professor with no tenure).
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in this country's armed services.", 33 Therefore, because military enlistment
is not a property interest, a procedural due process challenge to discrimina-
tory military regulations will not prevent the discharge of an admitted
homosexual.
The second element examined in a procedural due process challenge is
whether a plaintiff has been deprived of a liberty interest. In order to
demonstrate deprivation of a liberty interest, a plaintiff must show that the
government's action "might seriously damage ... [the plaintiff's] standing
and associations in his community" and result in "a stigma or other disa-
bility that forecloses his freedom to take advantage of other employment
opportunities."' 36 In Belier, the court held that because honorable discharge
documentation does not contain the reason for discharge,37 no stigma at-
taches, and the plaintiff's ability to obtain employment is not impaired.
Therefore, no liberty interest is affected.
In Rich v. Secretary of the Army, Army records that had been disclosed to
the public mentioned the plaintiff's homosexuality. 38 The court found that
this information would neither stigmatize the plaintiff nor jeopardize future
employment because he had consented to its release.39
Rich and Belier illustrate that courts will not hold military regulations
mandating the discharge of homosexuals unconstitutional on procedural due
process grounds. Therefore, to successfully challenge such regulations on
due process grounds, plaintiffs must attack on substantive due process
grounds.
33. Id. (citing Lindenau v. Alexander, 663 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1981)).
34. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that a state law forbidding
the teaching of a foreign language to any child who has not passed the eighth grade invades the
liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment). The Supreme Court describes a liberty
interest as follows:
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to wor-
ship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those priviliges long recognized... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.
Id.; see also Miller v. City of Mission, 705 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1983) (describing a liberty
interest as (1) the protection of one's good name, reputation, honor, and integrity; and (2)
freedom to take future employment opportunities).
35. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972) (holding that there is no Four-
teenth Amendment property interest in reemployment for professor with no tenure).
36. Id.
37. Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905
(1981).
38. Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1227 (10th Cir. 1984).
39. Id.
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II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide individuals with substan-
tive due process protection from governmental deprivation of fundamental
liberties.' Substantive due process requires not only that legislation be fair
and reasonable in its content but also in its application.4"
When challenging regulations that bar homosexuals from the military,
plaintiffs have argued that the line of privacy cases applies to homosexual
behavior.42 More precisely, they contend that courts should extend the right
to privacy, which recognizes an individual's autonomy in private sexual mat-
ters, to protect consensual homosexual conduct."3 For example, in
Dronenburg v. Zech, a twenty year-old petty officer admitted that he was a
homosexual and had engaged in homosexual conduct.' Because these ac-
tions violated Navy regulations, he was discharged.45 Dronenburg argued
that mandatory discharge for homosexual conduct violated his constitu-
tional right to privacy." He cited Griswold,47 Eisenstadt,48 and Roe,49 argu-
ing that the government should not interfere with personal decisions
pertaining to one's own body.5° Relying on the principles of privacy set
forth in these cases, Dronenburg argued that "private consensual homosex-
ual activity must be held to fall within the zone of constitutionally protected
privacy." 5'
40. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding a fundamental
right to privacy in the marital relationship); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925) (finding a fundamental right to raise and educate children according to parental
wishes); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (finding that parents have a funda-
mental right to have their children educated as they choose). Subsequent decisions broadened
the rights of privacy to include other situations and individuals. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 153 (1973) (extending the right to privacy to include a woman's right to choose whether
or not to abort a pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972) (extending the
right to privacy beyond the marital relationship and recognizing the right to distribute contra-
ceptives to unmarried adults).
41. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1429 (6th ed. 1990).
42. See Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting right to
privacy and equal protection attack on regulations barring homosexuals from the military);
Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 1980) (rejecting substantive due process
attack on regulations barring homosexuals from the military), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905
(1981).
43. 741 F.2d at 1391; 632 F.2d at 807.
44. 741 F.2d at 1389.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1391.
47. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
48. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
49. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
50. 741 F.2d at 1391.
51. Id.
1992]
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Responding to the plaintiff's argument, Judge Robert Bork cited Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond.52 The district court in Doe found
that the right to privacy did not extend to private, consensual homosexual
conduct because it bore no relation to marriage, the sanctity of the home,
procreation, or family life. 3 In Dronenburg, Judge Bork stated, "The Court
has listed as illustrative of the right of privacy such matters as activities
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and
child rearing and education. It need hardly be said that none of these covers
a right to homosexual conduct."W5 4 The court observed that the judiciary
does not possess the power to make law55 and therefore should not create
new rights that are not firmly rooted in the Constitution.56 As such, it held
that because there is no constitutional right to engage in homosexual con-
duct, the court has no authority to create one.57
In 1986, Bowers v. Hardwick foreclosed the possibility of an extension of
the right to privacy to homosexual conduct.5" In Bowers, the Supreme
Court recognized that the right to privacy is limited to marriage, family, and
procreative choice and does not extend to homosexual acts. 59 Therefore,
there is no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.60 Bowers
employed the Dronenburg reasoning solidifying the constitutionality of mili-
tary regulations discharging homosexuals from the armed services.
Woodward v. United States61 relied on Bowers and rejected a Navy of-
ficer's claim "that homosexuality is constitutionally protected under the
right of privacy."62 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that
there was no fundamental constitutional right for homosexuals to engage in
consensual sodomy.6 a The court held: "Protection of homosexuality as a
52. 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (holding that a Virginia statute that criminalizes private homo-
sexual conduct is constitutional).
53. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1200-03 (E.D.
Va. 1975) (holding that the right to privacy does not extend to homosexual conduct), summa-
rily aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
54. 741 F.2d at 1395-96.
55. Id. at 1396.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1397.
58. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that there is no constitutional right to engage in homo-
sexual sodomy).
59. Id. at 190-91.
60. Id. at 191. See Powell Regrets Backing Sodomy Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1990, at
A3. Retired Supreme Court Justice Powell told a group of law students that his 1986 vote in
Bowers, which supported the majority's holding that consensual homosexual sodomy is a crim-
inal offense, was probably "a mistake." Id.
61. 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1295 (1990).
62. Id. at 1075.
63. Id.
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private right... is not an apparent or necessary result that can be reached
from the Supreme Court's precedent." 64
The fundamental right to privacy argument is weakened further by the
courts' insistence that there are fewer privacy expectations in the military
than in the civilian world. In Ben-Shalom v. Marsh 65 the plaintiff, a sergeant
in the Army Reserve, was discharged for being an admitted lesbian.66 The
court in Ben-Shalom stated that "[t]he privacy expectations of a civilian,
wherever their outer limit may be, cannot be compared to the substantially
more limited privacy expectations accompanying military life."'67 Hence,
homosexuals cannot rely on the established constitutional rights of privacy
to protect them from regulations mandating their discharge from the
military.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The discharge of admitted homosexuals from the military, and regulations
upon which the discharge is based, may be challenged under the First
Amendment rights of free speech and association. 6 In the military, how-
ever, freedom of speech is severely limited 69 and the First Amendment is not
a useful tool in the homosexual's fight to serve. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly recognized the military's special need to restrict its members'
First Amendment rights.7 ° In Brown v. Glines,7' the Court stated: "Speech
64. Id.
65. 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990). See Lou Chibbaro
Jr., Army Vet Wants Pentagon to Establish an All-Gay Regiment, WASH. BLADE, Nov. 16,
1990, at 9. Lesbian Army veteran Miriam Ben-Shalom recently sent a letter to the Pentagon
requesting that an all homosexual regiment serve active duty in the Persian Gulf. Id. She
wanted the Pentagon to reactivate the Army's 54th Massachusetts Volunteer Regiment, a unit
famous for its involvement in the Civil War because it consisted of freed American slaves. Id.
In her call to arms, she said, "the 54th is the regiment of choice because it, too, was a segre-
gated regiment of African-American men, freed slaves, who were told, as we [homosexuals]
are, that they were unfit to serve, a threat to morale and good order and security." Id. at 9.
The Pentagon has stated that it has no plans to change its policy towards homosexuals. Id.
66. 881 F.2d at 456.
67. Id. at 465.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
69. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 352-54 (1980) (finding that requiring members of
the Air Force to obtain approval from their commanders before circulating petitions on Air
Force bases does not violate the First Amendment); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758-59
(1973) (holding that the First Amendment overbreadth argument is not applicable to Articles
133 and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)).
70. See United States v. Priest, 21 C.M.A. 564, 570 (1972), 45 C.M.R. 338, 344 (1972).
The Court of Military Appeals stated that "[d]isrespectful and contemptuous speech, even
advocacy of violent change, is tolerable in the civilian community, for it does not directly affect
the capacity of the Government to discharge its responsibilities." Id. However, in the military
contemptuous speech or speech advocating change can damage the military's ability to carry
1992]
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that is protected in the civil population may... undermine the effectiveness
of response to command .... Speech likely to interfere with these vital
prerequisites for military effectiveness therefore can be excluded from a mili-
tary base."72
In Ben-Shalom v. Marsh,73 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit addressed a claim that a discharge for admitting homosexu-
ality violated the plaintiff's First Amendment right of free speech.74 Be-
cause the only evidence of the plaintiff's homosexuality was her own
admission, she argued that the Army regulation barring homosexuals from
the military "had the effect of chilling her freedom of expression as she
would no longer be able to make statements regarding her sexual orienta-
tion, statements that she would otherwise be free to make."75 The court
explained that the military world is very different from the civilian world,
and therefore speech that threatens discipline and readiness is not allowed.76
Homosexuals are likely to encounter difficulty in challenging regulations
on First Amendment grounds because of judicial deference to military deci-
sions.7 7 In Goldman v. Weinberger,78 an Air Force officer challenged a regu-
lation that prohibited the indoor display of religious garb on the grounds
that the regulation infringed his rights under the First Amendment's free
exercise of religion clause.79 The Supreme Court upheld this restriction and
stated that "when evaluating whether military needs justify a particular re-
striction.., courts must give great deference to the professional judgment of
military authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular mili-
out its mission. Thus, the court noted that "[tihe armed forces depend on a command struc-
ture that at times must commit men to combat, not only hazarding their lives but ultimately
involving the security of the Nation itself." Id. Because of the differing roles of civilian gov-
ernment and the military, speech that is constitutionally protected in the civilian world is not
protected in the military.
71. 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (finding that requiring members of the Air Force to obtain ap-
proval from their commanders before circulating petitions on Air Force bases does not violate
the First Amendment).
72. Id. at 354 (citations omitted).
73. 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
74. Id. at 458-60.
75. Id. at 457.
76. Id. at 460 (citing Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980)). The court held that
admitting one's homosexuality constitutes speech that will damage the ability of the military to
carry out its mission because it will affect heterosexuals, damage morale, and detract from the
cohesiveness of the fighting unit. Id. at 460-61.
77. See id. at 461 ("[T]he branches of the military have great leeway in determining what
policies will foster the military mission, and courts will rarely second-guess those decisions.").
78. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
79. Id. at 506.
Homosexuals and the Military
tary interest."80 The Ben-Shalom court explained: "This deference means,
among other things, that policies that might not pass constitutional muster if
imposed upon a civilian population will be upheld in the military setting."'"
In addition to relying on the military's need to curtail the exercise of free
speech82 and the deference traditionally afforded military decisions,8 3 courts
have refused to recognize that the regulations discharging admitted homo-
sexuals violate the First Amendment. 4 For example, the Ben-Shalom court
concluded that "Ben-Shalom's First Amendment argument fails because it is
not speech per se that the regulation against homosexuality prohibits." 5
Under the regulation, the plaintiff was free to discuss homosexuality and
complain about the military's policy regarding homosexuals.86 She was also
free to associate with homosexuals.8 7 However, the regulation prohibited
her admission of homosexuality.8 8 The court reasoned that although Ben-
Shalom's admission was speech, it was primarily an act of identification, and
"it is the identity that makes her ineligible for military service, not the speak-
ing of it aloud.",89
In Rich v. Secretary of the Army,90 a plaintiff brought similar claims of
First Amendment violations.9" In accord with Ben-Shalom, Rich held that
the military regulations discharging admitted homosexuals did not directly
80. Id. at 507. The reason this regulation was in effect was to provide for uniformity in
military attire. Id.
81. Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 461 (stating that the application of the Constitution is differ-
ent in a military setting than in a civilian setting because the military must protect and defend
the United States); see also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (stating that in a
First Amendment setting the "military need not encourage debate or tolerate protest to the
extent that such tolerance is required of the civilian state by the First Amendment."); Chappell
v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983) ("[C]ompliance with military procedures and orders must
be virtually reflex with no time for debate or reflection."); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354
(1980) (stating that unlike civilians, military personnel must be prepared to act on the battle-
field without question).
82. 444 U.S. at 354; Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743-44 (1974) (holding that First
Amendment overbreadth argument is not applicable to Articles 133 and 134 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)).
83. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
84. See Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 458-62; Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220,
1228-29 (10th Cir. 1984) (rejecting procedural due process attack on regulations barring
homosexuals from the military).





90. Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1228-29 (10th Cir. 1984).
91. Id. at 1228 (discussing plaintiff's allegations that the Army's regulation infringed
upon his First Amendment rights of free speech and free association with other homosexuals).
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curtail freedom of speech or association.92 As one commentator noted:
All of these courts... have drawn a distinction between the words
spoken and the reality they represent-the expression is protected,
the lifestyle is not. This distinction can be defended by reference to
a vision of the [F]irst [A]mendment that protects homosexuality
only as a competitor in a necessary free marketplace of ideas.93
In summary, the First Amendment is not an effective weapon in homosex-
uals' fight to enter and remain in the military. For many reasons "[F]irst
Amendment jurisprudence cannot accurately conceptualize or adequately
protect all aspects of gay identity."94 First, the government curtails freedom
of speech on all subjects in the military. Second, the courts show deference
to military decisions to curtail speech. Third, courts state that admitting
one's homosexuality is not speech per se, nor is it protected by the First
Amendment. Instead, it constitutes a form of identification.
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION
Despite significant constitutional impediments, homosexuals may have a
realistic expectation of constitutional protection under the equal protection
clause of the Fifth Amendment.9" If homosexuals are found to be a "suspect
class,",96 deserving of enhanced constitutional protection, the Supreme Court
will apply a strict scrutiny analysis to regulations barring their integration
into the military.97 Under the equal protection provisions of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, no government official, agent, or entity may de-
prive any person of the equal protection of the laws.9" Homosexuals and
92. Id. at 1229.
93. Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect
Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1294 (1985).
94. Id. at 1296. The author bases his assertion on the decision in Mathews v. Marsh, 755
F.2d 182 (1st Cir. 1985), where the court ordered reenrollment of a Reserve Officer Training
Corps (ROTC) cadet that declared she was a lesbian. Even though the court decided in favor
of the plaintiff on First Amendment grounds, "the court left unanswered how much expression
beyond pure speech would be protected by the First Amendment." Id.
95. Jerel McCrary & Lewis Gutierrez, The Homosexual Person in the Military and in
National Security Employment, 5 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 115, 140 (1979-80).
96. See infra text and accompanying notes 128-31 (describing the elements necessary for
suspect class identification and protection by the Court's application of strict scrutiny to dis-
criminatory laws).
97. Denise Dunnigan, Note, Constitutional Law.: A New Suspect Class: A Final Reprieve
for Homosexuals in the Military?, 42 OKLA. L. REV. 273, 274 (1989); TRIBE, supra note 23
§ 16-13 at 1465 ("The core idea of equal protection strict scrutiny... is to subject governmen-
tal choices to close inspection in order to preserve substantive values of equality and
autonomy.").
98. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution af-
fords equal protection to citizens and is incorporated into the Fifth Amendment which applies
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heterosexuals in the military are similarly situated99 individuals. However,
homosexuals are treated differently by being excluded from serving in the
military. Therefore, homosexuals who are barred from serving in the mili-
tary may have a legitimate claim that they are being denied equal protection
of the laws."° °
A. Two Strands of Equal Protection Analysis
There are two strands to equal protection analysis. The first is the funda-
mental rights strand and the second is the suspect class strand.101
Under the fundamental rights strand, a court examines the constitutional-
ity of a statute by using strict scr'tiny to determine whether the discrimina-
tory nature of a statute impinges on a specially protected constitutional
right."°2 Under the suspect class strand, courts apply strict scrutiny analysis
when examining the constitutionality of a statute that discriminates against a
to the federal government. TRIBE, supra note 23, at § 16-1, at 1437. Thus, "[e]qual protection
analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment."
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (holding that the expenditure limitations of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 as amended in 1974 violated the First Amendment).
99. See infra note 100. We must keep in mind that:
[a] homosexual is after all a human being, and a citizen of the United States despite
the fact that he finds his sex gratification in what most consider to be an unconven-
tional manner. He is as much entitled to the protection and benefits of the laws and
due process fair treatment as others ....
McConnel v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809, 814 (D. Minn. 1970), order rev'd, 451 F.2d 193 (8th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972).
100. The equal protection clause directs that "all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike." F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia., 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). Tribe notes
that "[w]hen the legal order that both shapes and mirrors our society treats some people as
outsiders or as though they were worth less than others, those people have been denied the
equal protection of the laws." TRIBE, supra note 23, at § 16-21, at 1515 (citing Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 217 n. 14 (1982) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment is designed to abolish
"class or caste" treatment)).
101. POLYviOS POLYVIOU, EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS 179 (1980).
102. For examples of fundamental rights protected by strict scrutiny, see Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (holding that any law restricting interstate travel will be
subject to strict scrutiny). In Shapiro, the Court held that because the right to travel interstate
is fundamental, any law prohibiting this constitutional right will be subject to strict scrutiny.
Id. Unless such a law is "shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental inter-
est, [it] is unconstitutional." Id. at 634. Tribe states that "[i]n Shapiro the Warren Court
made its earliest major statement of the fundamental rights strand of equal protection strict
scrutiny." TRIBE, supra note 23, § 16-8, at 1455; see also Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (invalidating state poll tax on grounds that it burdened the funda-
mental right to vote); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that procreation
is a fundamental right and declaring invalid a statute calling for the sterilization of persons
convicted two or more times of "felonies involving moral turpitude").
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suspect class. 10 3 When applying strict scrutiny, a court will uphold a dis-
criminatory classification only if it is necessary to promote a compelling
state interest. 10 4
If the classification does not burden a fundamental right or the class is not
suspect, the courts will apply a more deferential, rational basis test.'0 5 The
rational basis test requires only that the classification bear "some rational
relationship to legitimate state purposes.""' 6 Under a rational basis test,
courts presume that a rational relationship exists between a statute and the
legitimate goals of the state. Therefore, the challenger has a heavy burden of
proof to show that a rational relationship does not exist.' °7 This burden is
heavy because under rational basis scrutiny the court defers to the legisla-
ture. 10 8 If a law neither violates a fundamental right, nor discriminates
against a suspect class, the court will defer to the legislature because the law
was presumably enacted after informed deliberation and meaningful debate.
Additionally, the legislature is theoretically the branch of government which
is the most responsive to the will of the people.
B. Bowers v. Hardwick and Equal Protection
Bowers v. Hardwick foreclosed the fundamental right strand of equal pro-
103. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (invalidating a law on equal protection
grounds that prohibited interracial marriages).
104. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (holding that
mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification). See infra note 158 and accompanying
text.
105. TRIBE, supra note 23, § 16-6, at 1451. There is also a middle tier of equal protection
analysis that falls between rational basis and strict scrutiny. POLYVIOU, supra note 101, at
221. Intermediate level scrutiny requires that a discriminatory statute substantially relates to
an important state interest or it will be struck down. POLYVIOU, supra note 101, at 268-69.
Intermediate scrutiny is most often applied to gender and illegitimacy cases. See Mills v.
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (applying intermediate scrutiny to illegitimacy classification);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to gender classification);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 686 (1972) (applying intermediate scrutiny to gender
classification).
106. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973) (holding that
wealth is not a suspect classification and education is not a fundamental right).
107. Under rational basis review, "[t]he traditional deference both to legislative purpose
and to legislative selections among means continues, on the whole, to make the rationality
requirement largley equivalent to a strong presumption of constitutionality." TRIBE, supra
note 23, § 16-2, at 1442-43. For examples of rational basis review, see id., § 16-2, at 1442-43
n.18.
108. Separation of powers principles motivate the Court to be deferential to the decisions of
the legislature. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Public Values Interests, and the Equal Protection
Clause, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 127, 142 n.59 (stating that because of separation of powers con-
cerns, the Court is reluctant to intervene with the legislature's decisions).
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tection to homosexuals. 1" Holding that there is no fundamental right to
homosexual sodomy between consenting adults," 0 the Bowers decision effec-
tively made it impossible for homosexuals to derive protection from the fun-
damental right strand of equal protection. However, Bowers did not
foreclose the suspect class strand of equal protection from protecting homo-
sexuals from discriminatory military regulations."'1 In Bowers, the Court
limited its holding to the substantive due process issue-whether homosex-
ual sodomy between consenting adults was a fundamental right protected by
the right to privacy. "2 The Bowers Court never addressed the issue of
whether homosexuals constitute a suspect class. 1 3 Bowers "dealt only with
the constitutional status of laws that criminalize sodomy, and only consid-
ered the validity of those laws in the context of a substantive due process
challenge." 1
4
Even though the Bowers analysis and holding were limited to a substantive
due process issue, Ben-Shalom v. Marsh 115 applied Bowers in its equal pro-
tection analysis of the regulation calling for Ben-Shalom's discharge." 6 The
Ben-Shalom court stated that "[i]f homosexual conduct may constitutionally
be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-sus-
pect class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny for equal protection
purposes."'17
Bowers should not be viewed as foreclosing the possibility that homosexu-
als constitute a suspect class. Its holding "should not be expanded into an
adjudication of homosexuals' equal protection status .... [T]he constitution-
ality of laws against homosexual acts [like sodomy in Bowers] does not neces-
109. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that there is no constitutional right to engage in homo-
sexual sodomy).
110. Id. at 191.
111. See Dunnigan, supra note 97, at 278; Note, Developments in the Law: Sexual Orienta-
tion and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1568 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Developments];
Tracey Rich, Note, Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Wake of Bowers v. Hardwick, 22
GA. L. REV. 773, 793 (1988).
112. 478 U.S. at 190. Under a due process analysis like that used in Bowers, the focus is on
historical practice and tradition. However, equal protection analysis takes a different focus.
Equal protection "protects disadvantaged groups of individuals from governmental discrimi-
nation, even where the discrimination is enshrined in a deep historical tradition." Jantz v.
Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1546 (D. Kan. 1991) (holding that a government classification based
on an individual's sexual orientation is suspect). Bowers established that homosexual sodomy
was not an historically protected right, but the Court did not address the issue of whether
discrimination against homosexuals is constitutional. Id. at 1546.
113. Id.
114. Note, Developments, supra note 111, at 1568.
115. 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
116. Id. at 464.
117. Id.
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sarily imply the constitutionality of laws discriminating against homosexuals
[like the regulations in the military requiring the discharge of homosexu-
als]." ' " Therefore, despite the Bowers holding, an equal protection analysis
should be available to individuals challenging military regulations banning
homosexuals.
C Futility of Rational Basis Test and Military Regulations
If courts do not declare that homosexuals are a suspect class, they will
only apply minimal scrutiny to discriminatory military regulations.' 9 Mini-
mal scrutiny requires only that the regulation further some legitimate state
interest. '20 Courts are free to hypothesize about any possible legitimate state
interests, and thus any regulation receiving rational basis review will pass
constitutional muster.' 2' Commentators argue that a rational basis review is
used "merely as a rubber-stamp .... Under the rational relationship
test, the court will defer to the legislature's decisions.' 2' Therefore, a homo-
sexual challenging a discriminatory regulation will bear the difficult burden
of proving that a regulation has "no rational basis for any possible legitimate
118. Rich, supra note 11, at 793. ("This situation is analogous to that in the case of Robin-
son v. California [370 U.S. 660 (1962)]. In Robinson, the Supreme Court held that drug use
(conduct) could be criminalized, but that drug addiction (the desire to engage in the conduct)
could not be criminalized.").
119. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 463-64 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1296 (1990).
120. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); see also Harris
M. Miller III, Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny
to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 808 (1984). A legitimate
state interest is something that furthers the public good. See generally Joseph Tussman &
Jacobus tenBroeck, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949) (examining
development of the equal protection clause and critiquing its use by the U.S. Supreme Court).
121. Miller, supra note 120, at 808; see also Steffan v. Cheney, 60 U.S.L.W. 2389, 2389 (D.
D.C. Dec. 9, 1991) (applying rational basis review to regulations barring homosexuals from the
military, the court held that protecting the armed forces from AIDS is a legitimate govern-
mental interest). This is the first time that the AIDS epidemic has been used as a rational basis
to support the military's homophobic regulations. However, because the AIDS epidemic is
spread not only by homosexuals but also heterosexuals, it falls short of a genuine rational basis
for banning homosexuals from the armed forces.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 196 (1983) (upholding royalty owner
exemption from oil and gas severance tax because the legislature "could reasonably have deter-
mined" that an exemption would encourage investments into oil or gas production); Julia K.
Skullens, Note, Thus Far and No Further: The Supreme Court Draws the Outer Boundary of
the Right to Privacy, 61 TUL. L. REV. 907, 926 n.153 (1986-87); see also McGinnis v. Royster,
410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973) (stating that a government regulation will generally be presumed to
be valid under equal protection analysis as long as the classification drawn by the regulation
"rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose").
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good."' 24 Because deference to the legislature is given under a rational basis
review, homosexuals must be recognized as a suspect class in order to receive
enhanced judicial review of discriminatory military regulations. If homosex-
uals are a suspect class, courts will examine legislative decisions more
closely, applying strict scrutiny, and thereby requiring the presence of a
compelling state interest to justify discrimination against a homosexual.12
V. AN ARGUMENT FOR SUSPECTNESS
The Supreme Court rarely designates new suspect classes. 12 6 Homosexu-
als share the same characteristics as race, yet courts have given no convinc-
ing reasoning why suspect class status has been denied to homosexuals.'2 7
The Supreme Court's refusal to grant homosexuals suspect class status is
unfounded after examining their status in light of the traditional suspect
class characteristics. The Court has recognized that the following factors
indicate a suspect class: whether the group has suffered a history of discrimi-
nation, 128 whether the class is a "discrete and insular minority,"' 29 whether
the classification is based on an "immutable" characteristic, 30 and whether
the classification is based upon incorrect stereotypes.'
3
'
Each of these characteristics applies to homosexuals. 32 First, homosexu-
124. Miller, supra note 120, at 808 ("In virtually every case in which rationality review is
the standard, the Court upholds the challenged law.").
125. See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text for interpretation of the "necessary to
further a compelling state interest" language.
126. Dunnigan, supra note 97, at 288.
127. POLYVIOU, supra note 101, at 239-40. But in Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454,
464 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990), the court stated that suspect class
status need not be given to homosexuals because homosexual conduct may constitutionally be
criminalized. However, this is no longer a valid reason to deny homosexuals suspect class
status because homosexual conduct has been decriminalized in 25 states. SARBIN & KAROLS,
supra note 19, at A-21.
128. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1976) (declin-
ing to hold that age classifications are suspect).
129. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (Stone, J.) (stat-
ing that the passing of the Filled Milk Act of Mar. 4, 1923, is within the scope of congressional
power to regulate interstate commerce and consistent with due process); Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1981) (stating that class exclusion from the political process may be a
factor in finding a class to be suspect).
130. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (holding that differential treat-
ment to male and female members of the military for the sole purpose of achieving administra-
tive convenience, violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment).
131. Id. at 685 (Brennan, J.).
132. See Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1345-49 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 384 (1990); see also supra note I ll and accompanying text.
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als have historically been subject to hostility and discrimination.' 3 3 They
face dismissal from employment if their sexual orientation is discovered.
3 4
They are barred from serving in the military and have continually been pre-
cluded from raising children.1' As the federal district court concluded in
High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office,13 6 "lesbians
and gay men have been the object of some of the deepest prejudice and ha-
tred in American society."' 1
37
Second, homosexuals constitute a "discrete and insular minority.'
13
They lack the numbers and the political power to effect changes in the
laws.139 The existence of laws that discriminate against homosexuals evi-
dences their lack of political power."4 Widespread discrimination against
homosexuals has impaired the political recourse of their community in state
and local legislatures, as well as in Congress. 14 1 Because of society's con-
tempt for homosexuality,142 homosexuals are generally unwilling to declare
their homosexuality or seek public office.' 3
Third, regulations discriminating against homosexuals are based upon an
"immutable" characteristic.'" An individual does not choose to be homo-
133. COLIN J. WILLIAMS & MARTIN S. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALS AND THE MILITARY
24-25 (1971).
134. Id. at 24.
135. Note, Developments, supra note 111, at 1567.
136. 668 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
137. Id. at 1369.
138. Id. at 1370. See supra note 90.
139. Id. at 1370. In High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 895
F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals cited antidiscrimination provi-
sions in three states, an executive order in New York, and some local ordinances and stated
that "homosexuals are not without political power; they have the ability to and do attract the
attention of the lawmakers, as evidenced by such legislation." Id. at 574. However, piecemeal
successes in local legislation are not proof of political power and not a reason to deny homo-
sexuals the benefit of heightened scrutiny. Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1550 (D. Kan.
1991). The Jantz court stated that "[t]he existence of isolated, local anti-discrimination suc-
cesses is clearly insufficient to deprive homosexuals of the status of a suspect classification."
Id. If blacks, who are protected by three constitutional amendments; major federal Civil
Rights Acts of 1866, 1870, 1871, 1875, 1957, 1960, 1964, 1965, and 1968; and antidiscrimina-
tion laws in 48 states are politically powerless and thus a suspect class, then homosexuals
should be classified similarly. Id. Despite a small homosexual lobby, homosexuals still need
the protection of the courts. Politicians may not respond to gay concerns because by legislat-
ing against gay-prejudice, politicians themselves become the target of prejudice. Miller, supra
note 120, at 825-27.
140. Id.
141. High Tech Gays, 668 F. Supp. at 1370.
142. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 162 (1980).
143. See id. at 163.
144. Volumes of scientific data exist to prove that homosexuality is an immutable charac-
teristic. See, e.g., ALAN P. BELL ET AL., SEXUAL PREFERENCE: ITS DEVELOPMENT IN MEN
AND WOMEN 211, 222 (1981); Eli Coleman, Changing Approaches to the Treatment of Homo-
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sexual. 145 Homosexuality should be classified as an immutable trait because
it is so central to "a person's identity that it would be irrational for the
government to penalize a person for an unwillingness to change."' 14 6 Scien-
tific research has shown that an individual's sexual orientation is established
so early in life that it is practically impossible to change it."'
Despite this evidence, homosexuality has been characterized as a mental
disease that can be cured.14 In the 1930s and 1940s, homosexuals were sent
to psychiatrists for diagnosis and treatment designed to purge their sexual
orientation. 149 However, in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970's, in-depth studies
concluded that homosexuality was not a mental illness.' 50 In 1974, the
American Psychiatric Association deleted the diagnosis of homosexuality
from its Diagnostic Manual. '5 1 The findings of these studies combined with
the deletion of homosexuality from the Manual of the American Psychiatric
Association support the premise that homosexuality is immutable. Aside
from the scientific evidence showing homosexuality is an immutable charac-
teristic, "complete and absolute immutability simply is not a prerequisite for
sexuality: A Review, in HOMOSEXUALITY: SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL ISSUES
81-88 (William Paul et al. eds., 1982); Frank Acosta, Etiology and Treatment of Homosexual-
ity: A Review, 4 ARCH. SEXUAL BEHAV. 9, 23-24 (1975); N. McConaghy, Is a Homosexual
Orientation Irreversible?, 129 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 556, 563 (1976); Michael W. Ross & Olli
W. Stalstrom, Exorcism as Psychiatric Treatment: A Homosexual Case Study, 8 ARCH. SEX-
UAL BEHAV. 379 (1979). Judge Norris, who sits in the District Court in Kansas, has expressed
the issue in terms a lay person can appreciate: "If the government began to discriminate
against heterosexuals, 'how many heterosexuals would find it easy not only to abstain from
heterosexual activity but also shift the object of their desires to persons of the same sex?'"
Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1548 (D. Kan. 1991) (citing Watkins v. U.S. Army 875 F.2d
699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989)).
145. Simon LeVay, a neuroscientist at the Salk Institute in San Diego, completed a study
that suggests homosexuality may have a biological component. LeVay examined the brain
tissue of 41 persons through routine autopsies. He examined the hypothalamus, which plays a
role in regulating sexual behavior, and found that one small node of the hypothalamus is
nearly three times larger in heterosexual men than in homosexual men. Curt Suplee, Brain
May Determine Sexuality, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1991, at Al. Richard C. Pillard of Boston
University School of Medicine stated that "if this research holds up, it would be the first
physiological difference of this kind ever shown." Id. In a study at Northwestern and Tufts
universities, researchers found that the genes men inherit from their parents may account for
up to 70% of the probability that a man will be a homosexual. Malcolm Gladwell, Genes Tied
To Sexual Orientation, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1991, at Al.
146. Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1347 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that
homosexuals are a suspect class and military regulations discriminating against them require
strict scrutiny), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 384 (1990).
147. See Coleman, supra note 144, at 81-88.
148. SARBIN & KAROLS, supra note 19, at 16.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 17.
151. Id. at 16.
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suspect classification."'' 52
Finally, statutes which discriminate against homosexuals are based upon
stereotypes that have no bearing on their ability to perform in or contribute
to society.' 53 The American Psychological Association passed a resolution
in 1975 explaining that no foundation exists for the stereotype that homosex-
uals cannot contribute to society.154 The resolution stated in part:
"[H]omosexuality per se implies no impairment in judgement, stability, reli-
ability or general social or vocational capabilities."' 5 The American Psy-
chiatric Association passed an identical resolution in 1976.156
VI. STRICT SCRUTINY APPLIED TO MILITARY REGULATIONS
Because homosexuals meet the Supreme Court's traditional criteria of sus-
pectness, 57 military regulations discriminating against them should be
strictly scrutinized by the judiciary. Under such a test, the regulation must
serve a compelling state interest158 and be specifically tailored to protect that
interest. 159 Military regulations discriminating against homosexuals will fail
under strict scrutiny because they are not specifically tailored to meet the
compelling state interests asserted by the military.
The military has given several justifications to explain its policy of dis-
crimination against homosexuals.' 6° Under rational basis review, courts
have accepted these justifications and the regulations have passed constitu-
152. Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1548 (D. Kan. 1991). The Supreme Court has
determined several times that a class is suspect without citing immutability as a requirement.
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985) (holding that
mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (holding that a statute requiring police officers to retire at
age fifty does not deny equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
153. Note, Developments, supra note 11l, at 1567.
154. SARBIN & KAROLS, supra note 19, at 16-17.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 126-56 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (holding that racial prejudice
cannot justify a racial classification removing an infant child from the custody of its natural
mother); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (holding that
mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification).
159. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982) (holding that Texas violated the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by excluding illegal aliens from attending the public
schools).
160. The justifications are set forth in Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 811 (9th Cir.
1980) (rejecting substantive due process attack on regulations barring homosexuals from the
military), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981) and Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1398
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting right to privacy and equal protection attack on regulations barring
homosexuals from the military).
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tional muster.161 However, under strict scrutiny review, courts would most
likely not accept these justifications.
The first justification advanced by the military is that the presence of
homosexuals would harm organizational effectiveness and discipline. 62 The
services' fear that prejudice towards homosexuals would detrimentally affect
military cohesiveness, morale, and discipline. There is a concern that gay
officers would not be able to serve as effective leaders because of their subor-
dinates' lack of trust or respect for them due to their sexual orientation.1
63
Prejudice is not a valid justification for discriminating against homosexu-
als. Prejudice against Blacks was the justification for not allowing them to
serve in the military.'4 Resistance against integrating Blacks in the military
was based upon many of the same reasons for not allowing homosexuals to
serve. 165 Many feared that prejudice would harm discipline, morale, and
cohesiveness;' 66 however, none of these problems came to fruition and crip-
pled the military. 167 When the armed forces desegregated, social science
specialists assisted in developing programs to combat racial prejudice.' 61
Later, women seeking to enter the military faced the same arguments.
169
However, the military has also successfully integrated women into its ranks.
The military now serves as a model for racial and gender integration. 170 One
commentator notes that "[iut would be wise to consider applying the experi-
ence of the past 40 years [of integration of Blacks] to the integration of
homosexuals." 171
Indirect evidence shows that the military can successfully integrate homo-
sexuals.' 72 First, the majority of homosexuals with military service records
have received honorable discharges 173 and compiled exceptional perform-
ance records. 174 Second, quasi-military organizations have successfully inte-
161. See, e.g., Dronenburg, 741 F.2d 1388; Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220
(10th Cir. 1984); Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788.
162. SARBIN & KAROLS, supra note 19, at 24.
163. Note, Developments, supra note 111, at 1561.





169. Id. at 29.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 25.
172. Id.
173. WILLIAMS & WEINBERG, supra note 133, at 187.
174. See Matthews v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 182 (1st Cir. 1985) (disenrolling Mathews from the
Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) after she admitted she was a lesbian was constitu-
tional); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Belier v. Middendorf, 632
F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
1992]
450 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 8:429
grated homosexuals. 175 In 1979, the San Francisco Sheriff's Department
initiated a program to integrate homosexuals into its ranks.' 76 Integration
was successful and nondisruptive to the mission of the Sheriff's Depart-
ment. 177 Studies showed that the homosexual members of the department
received better job performance ratings than heterosexual officers. 178 As a
result, the majority of law enforcement agencies in California now hire with-
out regard to sexual orientation. 179
The military also justifies its discriminatory regulations by asserting that
homosexuals are unable to perform their jobs effectively because of emo-
tional involvement with other homosexuals.' 80 This assertion is based upon
the stereotype that homosexuals are detrimentally affected by their relation-
ships. An inconsistency arises, however, because heterosexuals may just as
easily be involved in relationships that could affect their job performance.' 8 '
The rationale for the regulations applies to heterosexuals as well as to homo-
sexuals, thus the regulations are not specifically tailored to promote a com-
pelling governmental interest and would fail under strict scrutiny review.
The third reason the military gives for its discriminatory regulations is
that homosexuals may become involved in sexual relationships with other
soldiers under their command.' 82 As with the previous justification given by
the military, this problem may just as easily arise between heterosexuals. 8 3
A final justification used by the military to bar homosexuals from serving
in the military is the fear that homosexuals may be a security risk due to
their susceptibility to blackmail.' 84 However, adulterous heterosexuals are
175. SARBIN & KAROLS, supra note 19, at 26-27.
176. Id. at 27.
177. Id. at 26.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 27.
180. Note, Developments, supra note 111, at 1561.
181. For example, a heterosexual male may break up with his girlfriend and it may harm
his job performance.
182. See Note, Developments, supra note 111, at 1561.
183. A heterosexual woman may just as easily get involved sexually with a man under her
command as could a lesbian with a woman under her command. See supra notes 180-81, and
accompanying text.
184. See Dunnigan, supra note 97, at 288. Based on the military's phobia that homosexuals
are a security risk, the Air Force delayed Capt. Greg Greeley's discharge to question him after
they discovered he led the Lesbian and Gay Pride Parade in Washington, D.C. on June 23,
1991. The Air Force interrogated Capt. Greeley to determine whether he had given away any
secret information. In addition, they asked him to give the names of all gays and lesbians he
knew in the Air Force. Gay Parade Leader Questioned: Air Force Holds Up Captain's Dis-
charge, WASH. POST, June 25, 1991, at Al. Capt. Greeley refused to cooperate and after the
intercession of Rep. Joseph Kennedy (D-Mass.), Rep. Gerry Studds (D-Mass.), and Rep. Bar-
ney Frank (D-Mass.), Capt. Greeley was honorably discharged. Nick Bartolomeo, After Delay
Air Force Grants Gay Captain Honorable Discharge, WASH. BLADE, June 28, 1991, at 1.
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just as susceptible to blackmail as are homosexuals.185 Additionally, be-
cause a number of states have decriminalized homosexual behavior, the dan-
ger of homosexuals being blackmailed has greatly diminished. 8 6
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) has laid to rest the mili-
tary's fears of integration."8 7 All of the government's concerns are covered
by the UCMJ.' s For example, if subordinates disobey gay officers or if
homosexuals develop emotional relationships across ranks, the UCMJ pun-
ishes or otherwise deters such action. 89
VII. REASONS FOR INTEGRATION: BEYOND STRICT
SCRUTINY ANALYSIS
In addition to the constitutional mandate of homosexual integration in the
military under the equal protection clause, there are certain realities that call
for integration. These realities include the large number of undetected
homosexuals presently serving in the military. " One commentator ob-
served that they "are performing their military roles satisfactorily and their
sexual conduct has not come to the attention of their commanders." 19 ' Fur-
thermore, "[t]he fact that only a[n] infinitesimal percentage of men and wo-
men are identified as homosexuals leads to an inescapable inference. Many
undetected homosexuals serve in the military, enlisted and officers, men and
185. SARBIN & KAROLS, supra note 19, at 29. The Pentagon commissioned this report to
determine whether homosexuals in the military pose a security risk. The report concluded that
they do not and recommended that the military integrate homosexuals into the military. The
Pentagon rejected the entire report claiming that it was biased, flawed, offensive, wasteful of
government resources, and beyond the mandate of the commission. Elaine Sciolino, Report
Urging End of Homosexual Ban Rejected by Military, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 22, 1989, at Al.
186. Sciolino, supra note 185, at A26. As of 1988, there were no laws prohibiting sodomy
in 25 states. Id.
187. Seth Harris, Permitting Prejudice to Govern: Equal Protection, Military Deference, and
the Exclusion of Lesbians and Gay Men from the Military, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
171, 205 (1989-90).
188. Articles 77-134 of the UCMJ list the offenses for which members of the military can
be court-martialed. 10 U.S.C. §§ 877-934 (1988).
189. For a full analysis of each UCMJ provision and how it would affect the integration of
homosexuals into the military, see Harris, supra note 187, at 205-06.
190. SARBIN & KAROLS, supra note 19, at 21-24. This paper cites the studies of Kinsey
and Mihalek that estimated the percentage of homosexuals in the population. Id. at 22-23.
The authors conclude that fewer military personnel have been discharged for being homosex-
ual than should have been under the Kinsey and Mahalek estimates of the number of homo-
sexuals in the population. Id. The National Lawyers Guild and the San Diego Veterans
Association state that 5 to 10% of military personnel are gay, and approximately 1,000 are
discharged every year for homosexuality. Mary Lang, Operation Closet Shield, CAL., April
1991, at 15.
191. SARBIN & KAROLS, supra note 19, at 23.
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women."1
9 2
In Watkins v. United States Army,' 93 the Ninth Circuit recognized that
homosexuals presently serve in the military without disturbing morale or
discipline.' 94 In Watkins, the Army allowed an admitted homosexual with
an outstanding fourteen year record of military service to reenlist. 95 When
the Army tried to deny Watkins' most recent reenlistment request, the court
held that the military was equitably estopped from refusing to reenlist Wat-
kins on the basis of his homosexuality because the Army overlooked his ho-
mosexuality in the past. 196 The court stated:
To estop the Army from denying Sgt. Watkins reenlistment on the
basis of his homosexuality would not disrupt important military
policies or adversely affect internal military affairs. It would sim-
ply require the Army to continue to do what it has repeatedly done
for fourteen years with only positive results: reenlist a single sol-
dier with an exceptionally outstanding military record.' 9 7
By allowing a fourteen year veteran who is a homosexual to remain in the
Army, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that homosexuals can function in
the military without affecting the cohesiveness or morale of the Army. By
referring to Watkins' outstanding record, the court inferred that sexual ori-
entation is not relevant in a discharge proceeding; rather, a soldier's per-
formance in his or her job should prevail.' 9
A final reason for integration, beyond strict scrutiny analysis, is the
changing tide of public opinion. The percentage of the public favoring ad-
mission of homosexuals into the military has steadily increased. 99
192. Id. at 24.
193. 875 F.2d 699, 711 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 384 (1990).
194. Id. at 709.
195. Id. at 701-02.
196. Id. at 711.
197. Id. at 706.
198. See Lou Chibbaro, Jr., Poll Reveals 81% Oppose Ousting Gays From Military, WASH.
BLADE, April 19, 1991, at 1. In a nationwide poll commissioned by the Human Rights Cam-
paign Fund, 81% of those polled opposed the military's policy of discharging members for
being homosexual. Id.
199. A poll released in April 1991 conducted for the Human Rights Campaign Fund asked
the public if they favored admission of homosexuals to the armed forces. The poll revealed a
growing acceptance of homosexuals:
1977 - 51% favored admission of homosexuals into the military
1982 - 55% favored admission
1989 - 60% favored admission
1991 - 65% favored admission
In another poll conducted for the same organization, 81% of those questioned stated that if
homosexuals in the armed forces are doing good jobs they should not be discharged. Chibbaro,
supra note 198, at 1. Further evidence of changing attitudes has emerged on college campuses.
On May 3, 1991 at the Indiana University Board of Trustees meeting, the Board voted to keep
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CONCLUSION
Homosexuals do not currently receive constitutional protection against
the military's discriminatory regulations under procedural due process, sub-
stantive due process, the First Amendment, or the fundamental rights strand
of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In order for
homosexuals to serve in the United States military without the threat of dis-
charge, courts must declare homosexuals to be a suspect class under the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a suspect class,
homosexuals will be protected from the military's discriminatory regulations
under heightened strict scrutiny review.
Judges and the Department of Defense must set aside their homophobic
attitudes and recognize the fallacy and illogic of preventing able-bodied,
highly motivated soldiers from serving their country simply because they are
homosexuals.2"° The Supreme Court must break down the archaic legal and
social barriers that allow discrimination against homosexuals and realize
that homosexuals can ensure the high quality of the American military. The
Supreme Court should recognize that homophobic discriminatory military
regulations are improper and proclaim homosexuals to be a suspect class.
Troy R. Holroyd
the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) on the campus. However, in response to student
concerns about the military's discriminatory policies against homosexuals, the Board called for
an examination of the U.S. Department of Defense's policy of barring homosexuals from the
military. Students were concerned because the ROTC's policy conflicts with the University's
Code of Student Ethics which bars discrimination based on sexual orientation. Jay Judge,
ROTC to Stay Despite IUSA Opposition, IND. DAILY STUDENT, May 4, 1991, at 1. Similar
dissatisfaction with the military's policy has emerged on other college campuses. At the Buf-
falo campus of the State University of New York, military recruiters were ordered off the
campus on Sept. 20, 1991, in protest of the military's discrimination against homosexuals.
Dartmouth College in Hanover, NH will force ROTC programs off campus in April 1993
unless the military changes its policy of banning homosexuals. In Florida, at the University of
Tampa, credit for ROTC courses may be dropped if the ROTC continues banning homosexu-
als from enrolling. On Sept. 23, 1991, students at Georgetown University Law Center
marched in favor of banning the Judge Advocate Corps from employment recruiting unless the
ban on homosexuals is ended. William Mathews, Colleges Challenging DoD Ban on Homosex-
uals, AIR FORCE TIMEs, Oct. 14, 1991, at 18. At the University of Pennsylvania, ROTC will
be banned from campus by June 1993 unless the program agrees to admit homosexuals.
Huntly Collins, Penn Panel: ROTC Must Enroll Gays, PHIL. INQUIRER, Oct. 16, 1991, at B2.
200. As one commentator noted, "[A]t a minimum, judges, in particular, as well as attor-
neys, need to examine their homophobic attitudes and the many popularly held myths and
stereotypes. Only after such a reevaluation of judicial and social attitudes can our legal system
begin to achieve a fair and equal application of the laws to all persons." Rivera, supra note 14,
at 848.
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